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Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, McKEE, and AMBRO, Circuit Judges 
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*This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
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SMITH, Chief Judge.  
  
Defendant Glen Joseph challenges the sentence he received following his 
conviction of various offenses via jury trial.  Specifically, Joseph argues that the 
District Court failed to adequately consider a future state parole sentence resulting 
from the same underlying conduct and failed to give Joseph an acceptance of 
responsibility adjustment to which he was entitled.  BOP records indicate that Joseph 
was released from prison on May 28, 2019.   
As a threshold matter, we must address whether we have jurisdiction to 
adjudicate this appeal.  See United States v. Grape, 549 F.3d 591, 597 (3d Cir. 2008).  
Where a criminal defendant is challenging a sentence that he has already served in 
its entirety, he generally must prove that he is suffering a continuing injury in order 
to avoid mootness.  See United States v. Kissinger, 309 F.3d 179, 181 (3d Cir. 2002).  
In some instances, a defendant may be able to establish continuing jurisdiction where 
he is serving a term of supervised release and it is likely that the District Court would 
credit time overserved in prison against the term of supervised release.  See United 
States v. Cottman, 142 F.3d 160, 165 (3d Cir. 1998).  As to this option, however, the 
Supreme Court has since clarified that a term of supervised release is separate from 
a term of incarceration and should not be reduced based only on the fact a defendant 
overserved in prison.  United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 60 (2000).  Following 
Johnson, our Court therefore held that it must be “likely” that the sentencing court 
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would reduce the defendant’s term of supervised release in order for there to be a 
live case or controversy after a defendant has been released.  Burkey v. Marberry, 
556 F.3d 142, 149–50 (3d Cir. 2009). 
In supplemental briefing addressing the question of jurisdiction, Joseph 
identified no collateral consequences stemming from the alleged sentencing error.  
Instead, Joseph argues only that “if he prevails on his appeal and his case is 
remanded for resentencing, he may receive a credit against his term of supervised 
release for the excess term of imprisonment to which he was subjected.”  Suppl. Br. 
4.  In making this argument, Joseph relies on United States v. Jackson, 523 F.3d 234, 
241 (3d Cir. 2008).  In Jackson, however, the defendant was serving a term of 
supervised release and on appeal was challenging the length of that term of 
supervised release.  Id. at 242 (“Since Jackson is currently serving a term of 
supervised release, and because her challenge is to whether that term of release is 
reasonable, the issues of mootness and jurisdiction . . . do not arise.”).  Thus, the 
reasoning in Jackson is inapposite.  See Burkey v. Marberry, 556 F.3d 142, 148 (3d 
Cir. 2009) (“In Jackson, we held that collateral consequences are presumed where 
the appellant was still serving a term of supervised release and her challenge was to 
the reasonableness of the supervised release term.  Where, however, the appellant is 
attacking a sentence that has already been served, collateral consequences will not 
be presumed, but must be proven.” (internal citation omitted)). 
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Here, we see no reason to conclude the District Court would be likely to 
reduce the supervised release sentence it imposed a year ago, nor did Joseph suggest 
any basis for such a conclusion.  Indeed, he points to nothing more than a speculative 
chance that the District Court might reduce his supervised release term.  Under 
Burkey, this is far too thin a basis for the exercise of appellate jurisdiction.  Burkey, 
556 F.3d at 149 (“The possibility that the sentencing court will use its discretion to 
modify the length of Burkey’s term of supervised release . . . is so speculative that 
any decision on the merits . . . would be merely advisory.”).   
Nor could Joseph provide anything more than speculation, as the record 
indicates it is unlikely that the District Court would reduce Joseph’s term of 
supervised release.  He faced a supervised release range of one to three years, and 
the District Court chose to impose the high end of that range.  The independent 
import of the supervised release sentence, separate and apart from the term of 
incarceration, is demonstrated by the special conditions of supervised release 
imposed by the District Court, which include participation in a mental health 
program, among other things.  See United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 60 (2000) 
(“In the instant case, the transition assistance ordered by the trial court required 
respondent, among other conditions, to avoid possessing or transporting firearms 
and to participate in a drug dependency treatment program. These conditions 
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illustrate that supervised release, unlike incarceration, provides individuals with 
postconfinement assistance.”).  Under Burkey, this case is therefore moot.1   
Because Joseph has failed to establish that we have jurisdiction, we will 
dismiss this appeal.   
 
                                              
1 Joseph remains free to seek a modification of the term of supervised release under 
18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1).  See also United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 60 (2000). 
